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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE QUESTION 
Why do Russia, China and India demonstrate such a lack of enthusiasm in 
pursuing a concrete solution to the Iranian nuclear dilemma?  This paper will attempt to 
answer this question in terms of the motivations emerging powers have for risking the ire 
of established powerful states or the international community.  Realist theory would 
suggest that these countries are acting in their own best interests in order to establish 
themselves as regional hegemons while simultaneously weakening the position of the 
United States in the East.  This theory is lent credence by the fact that all three countries 
have little to lose in defying the United States and the European Three in their efforts to 
punish Iran for its failure to prove the innocuous nature of its nuclear programs.  The 
three countries have a great deal to lose, however, in curtailing or severing their ties with 
Iran, as their economies and strategic designs depend on continued and unfettered trade 
with the Persian nation. 
In a world of uneven distribution of wealth, power and resources, less powerful 
states will pursue whatever means necessary in order to guarantee their own security.  
Russia, China and India are acting in accordance with their own best interests, and the 
United States, as the current global hegemon, should expect to encounter resistance from 
these emerging powers over the Iranian nuclear issue.  These states have little to gain 
from following the lead of the United States in pursuance of punitive measures against 
the Iranian regime for its continued noncompliance with the wishes of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations.  Among the states of the United 
Nations, Russia, China and India are three whose economic and political situations will 
make it highly improbable if not impossible for them to support any seriously effective 
punitive action against Iran should the Middle Eastern state continue to pursue its nuclear 
aspirations in blatant defiance of international pressure.  Why do these countries present 
so much hesitation to impose internationally recognized punitive measures to stop Iran 
from ignoring the calls for cooperation from the U.N. and the IAEA? 
2 
This paper will analyze the Iranian case for its nuclear program, as well as the 
evidence behind the hesitation of Russia, China and India in pursuing effective measures 
against Iran.   
Chapter I will summarize the controversy surrounding the program, from the 
revelation of the clandestine aspects of the program in 2003 to the current rhetoric the 
Iranian leadership is putting forth in support of its position.  This chapter will also present 
a discussion of Realist ideologies relevant to the actions of three countries.  Case studies 
of Russia, China and India will then be presented in support of the idea that states will 
resist the suggestion of more powerful states if this resistance will a) advance the position 
of the noncompliant state and b) challenge or weaken the position of the state 
promulgating the suggestion to compliance.  Each case study contains a critical analysis 
of the most compelling reasons the country in question has for not supporting any type of 
punitive action against Iran.  An historical examination of the relations between the 
United States and Iran will follow, taking into account both real and delusional 
grievances aimed at the west from the Iranian leadership and subsequent responses from 
the United States.  In conclusion, an examination of the latest developments out of the 
IAEA, the EU-3 negotiating team, the U.S. administration, and the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) will be oriented to suggestions for future action.   
B. IMPORTANCE: THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR IRAN 
The severity of the Iranian nuclear problem and the ramifications of continued 
inaction on the part of the United Nations cannot be understated. 
Inaction on the part of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would allow 
for Iran to continue proceeding unhindered to the eventual development of nuclear 
weapons.  The countries examined in this work, in their unwillingness to act in 
accordance with the United States’ suggestions, are ignoring the many possible and 
egregious outcomes of a nuclear armed Iran.  This willingness to turn a blind eye is 
created by the consideration that the long-term negative consequences of severing ties 
with Iran greatly outweigh the possible outcomes of taking severe action against Tehran. 
1. Proliferation 
These possible outcomes include increased proliferation of nuclear weapons 
technology in a region of the world which historically been a bastion of extremist 
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ideology and anti-Western vituperations.  As a recognized state sponsor of terrorism, Iran 
should not be allowed to amass the requisite technology to inflict devastating harm on 
“The Great Satan” or other targets of its incendiary rhetoric.  The tradition of chanting 
“Death to America, Death to Israel” at Friday prayer sessions in Iran, while increasingly 
marginalized by the general population of the country, is still a reminder of the deep-
seated mistrust and historic ill-will espoused by the powerful clerical leadership of the 
country.   
2. Middle East Arms Race 
Another possible outcome of a nuclear Iran would be a nuclear arms race in the 
Middle East.  Neighboring states to Iran and around the Persian Gulf would certainly see 
Iran as at best the new regional hegemon worthy of suspicion or at worst an extremist 
threat to the already tenuous hold on stability in the Middle East should it become the 
first to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities.  “Arab pride will not tolerate an exclusive 
Persian bomb, despite all Teheran's rhetoric about a shared anti-Israeli mother of all 
Islamic weapons.”1  It would be unlikely that Arab nations would tolerate the only 
nuclear weapon residing in a country which the majority of Persian Gulf states have often 
attempted to balance out in the Middle East.2  
Religious differences and a divergent ideology concerning the role of oil as a 
weapon between Iran and the rest of the Persian Gulf states have created friction in the 
region for decades.  This religious tension in the area was most graphically illustrated in 
the tragically violent Iran/Iraq war, in which hundreds of thousands of lives were lost in 
Sunni dominated Iraq’s attempts to suppress a Shia Iran.  The Iranian regime has also 
threatened to curtail its oil distribution in response to any imposed punishments of its 




1 Victor Davis Hanson, “The Folly of a Nuclear Iran,” February 14, 2005, 
http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson021405.html, (accessed June 2, 2006). 
2 Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, Getting Ready for A Nuclear-Ready Iran, (Strategic Studies 
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), 25. 
3 Karl Vick 2006. “Iran Renews Threat to Withhold Oil; Bolton Issues Warning; Vote by U.N. Atomic 
Agency Looms,” The Washington Post, March 6, 2006, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed May 29, 
2006). 
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has long been held as a vital interest for the United States, and the threat of the removal 
of Iranian oil from the international marketplace, however unlikely, is cause for 
consideration among oil dependant countries. 
3. Treaty Credibility 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), of which Iran is a signatory, would 
also suffer another blow to its credibility if Iran were to proceed unhindered on its current 
path.  Iran has progressed on this program for over twenty years, only having revealed the 
extent of it over the past four years.  This largely clandestine program violated Iran’s 
obligations under the NPT in not allowing for inspections by the IAEA and withholding 
documentation as to the nature of all the materials and facilities involved in the research 
and development of nuclear technology.  “Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its 
Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent 
processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material 
was stored and processed.”4  The IAEA has time and again called for increased 
transparency concerning nuclear research on the part of the Iranian regime, to no avail.  
The years of wasted negotiations and inability on the part of the permanent five of the 
UNSC to come to any sort of binding resolution on the subject has effectively granted 
Iran free reign to conduct any and all research and development it needs in order to 
continue its pursuits.  The ultimate and most current result of the negotiations, pleas and 
exhortations of the international community has been the announcement- with great 
fanfare and bluster- by the Iranian President that Iran has indeed successfully enriched a 
small amount of uranium to levels suitable for use in nuclear power plants.5  Developing 
countries witness this apparent impotence on the part of the institution responsible for the 
curtailment of nuclear proliferation in the world society and lose faith in the ability of the 
international community to pursue nuclear security.  Regimes with aspirations of going 
nuclear witness the apparent ease with which Iran has proceeded and are encouraged. 
 
4 International Atomic Energy Agency, Report by the Director General, June 6, 2003, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf (accessed May 29, 2006). 
5 Carla Anne Robbins. “Iran Defies Security Council by Enriching Uranium; Technical Challenges 
Remain to Reaching Weapons Grade as Tehran Trumpets Progress,” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2006, 
www.proquest.com/ (accessed May 29, 2006). 
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The failure of several years of negotiations by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and several European countries cannot hope to be reversed without 
dedicated support from all of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC).  Russia and China, holding veto power in the UNSC, pose the most 
significant obstacles to the imposition of binding policy aimed at forestalling Iran’s 
continued pursuit of the entire nuclear fuel cycle.  India, while not in a position to halt 
any sanctions from being imposed, could significantly lessen the severity of those 
sanctions by continuing its economic projects with Iran in the event that sanctions are 
actually placed on the country.  All three countries would stand to lose a great deal of 
revenue and energy resources should effective energy sanctions be imposed by the 
UNSC.  These losses would come at a time when either the economies of the countries in 
question are dependant upon Iran for their continued growth or when positive relations 
with Iran are more important than international opinion. 
Several factors considered in this work lend credence to the idea that Iran is 
uninterested in yielding to international pressure and that some governments in a position 
to exert significant pressure on Iran are in fact unwilling to do so.  Historical resistance to 
western influence has long been a major obstacle in any dealings with Middle Eastern 
countries.  Iran also believes that the imposition of punitive measures on them would 
cripple the world economy, amounting to more suffering by those who would impose the 
sanctions than on the target of those sanctions.  These two perceptions combine to give 
the Iranian regime both motivation and courage to refuse the demands of the international 
community.   
Iran’s value as one of the most oil-rich regions in the world paints many of the 
options concerning how to halt Iran’s nuclear experimentation as unpalatable at best and 
economically devastating at worst.  There are very few options which the international 
community can exercise which would effectively eliminate the possibility of Iran 
attaining the capacity to build nuclear weapons.  The United States, having been dubbed 
“the Great Satan” by the Iranian regime, holds little if any sway in the country.  Russia, 
as a failed superpower trying once again to establish itself as a player in the international 
marketplace, has more to gain from a cooperative Iran as a customer for sales of military 
and energy technology.  China, possessed of an economy growing at a frenetic pace, 
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cannot afford to deprive itself of Iranian oil.  India’s economy is growing faster than most 
countries in the world, and faces the same reality as China- the availability of natural 
resources from Iran is essential to the continued prosperity that the country is currently 
enjoying. 
C. METHODOLOGY: REALIST THEORY APPLIED 
1. Origins 
The Greek historian Thucydides is one of the earliest cited promulgators of the 
ideology behind Realist theory.  In his work chronicling the Peloponnesian War, 
Thucydides suggested that this historic war was bound to happen due to the perception of 
threat on the part of the Lacedaemonians.6  This reaction to an external population 
perceived as growing in strength is what Realists believe continues to occur even into this 
day and age of increased communication and cooperation.  When a neighboring state is 
seen to have outstripped another in terms of military capability, the weaker state may 
likely act to reverse the other’s power or increase their own in order to decrease the 
likelihood of the developing state taking advantage of the imbalance of power by acting 
to subjugate the weaker.  The Realist understanding, is that a state’s political analysts will 
act out of consideration for not simply the actions and rhetoric of another state, but more 
out of an estimation of the capabilities of that state.  Keohane furthered this argument by 
arguing that states will address any perception of an imbalance of power by acting to 
amass or maintain “…sufficient power, alone or in coalitions, to maintain their essential 
security interests.”7  
“Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do 
so- or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors.”8  Kenneth Waltz’s 
introduction to Realist theory has been maligned for decades as a pessimistic view of the 
world order.  Peace and harmony among states, while a noble and enviable goal, is rarely 
realized, and if achieved, does not survive for long.  To suggest that threats lie 
everywhere and that a state must be constantly ready to kill or be killed seems defeatist in 
nature and suggests that man will never be able to live with one another.  As unpalatable 
 
6 Thucydides, “History of the Peloponnesian War,” 400 B.C., (1951), chapter 1, paragraph 24; quoted 
in Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), 7. 
7 Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), 8. 
8 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Theory of International Politics” (New York, McGraw Hill, 1979), 102. 
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as this may seem to those who wish to live in a world defined by cooperation and 
dedication to peace, political leaders will always demonstrate the will to provide for 
themselves and their people first, even if this entails subjugating another population 
through the use of force.  The idea that a state has not only the power, but the 
responsibility to act out of its own self interest goes against the fundamental moral 
principle of “do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”  When acting at the 
state level, a regime must set aside consideration for those not under it’s charge in order 
to promote the prosperity of its own people.  “Do unto others before they do unto you” 
becomes the mantra of states who wish continued survival for themselves and their 
populations.   
Russia, China and India are less interested in joining the EU-3 or the United 
States in keeping Iran out of the nuclear club than they are in solidifying and extending 
their influence and success in their own regions of the world.  They are more interested in 
becoming regional powers in their own right, and Iran provides the means for them to 
pursue this goal.   
2. Bandwagoning 
The tenet of bandwagoning would suggest that these comparatively weaker 
countries would be willing to go along with the policies of a hegemon in order to share in 
the spoils of one who would be victorious in conflict.  Bandwagoning, however, is a 
largely internal phenomenon, as is evident with political figures during elections.  
Internally, everyone wants there to emerge a clear-cut winner, and when this individual 
begins to emerge, those who have the least chance of winning will look to joining the 
winner in order to provide for their own security.9   
3. Balancing 
Bandwagoning is not the phenomenon the world is witnessing in the 
disagreements concerning the Iranian nuclear dilemma.  Rather, these three countries are 
attempting to create a balance against the power of the United States throughout the 
world.  In an external conflict such as that going on now with Iran and the rest of the 
world, the countries addressed in this paper are less interested in seeing a clear cut winner 
 
9 Waltz, 126. 
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emerge.10  Riding on the coattails of the U.S. hegemony cannot address the specific needs 
of these countries.  In the coming years and decades, the United States will not be able to 
provide for the continued growth of these emerging world powers in the arenas of energy 
security or trade.  An unfettered Iran offers a long term partner to these countries in both. 
China has the means to become the dominant economic power in Eastern Asia, 
possibly in the world.  India is rapidly developing the capacity to achieve the same status 
in South Asia.  Russia sees any weakening of the U.S. position in the world as a step 
towards once again achieving world power status along with the United States.  Iran is 
the common factor in all these considerations- from a realist standpoint, the issues 
surrounding Iran and the economic advantages Iran can provide will allow all these 
countries the ability to pursue their strategic goals. 
D. THE IRANIAN CASE 
The reason Iran has promulgated to the world for its dogged pursuit of the nuclear 
cycle in the face of international pressure to abandon the project is that a robust civilian 
nuclear energy program will free the Iranian nation from dependence on its own 
declining supply of domestically produced oil.  Iran maintains that it will be able to 
export more oil if nuclear energy can either significantly supplement or replace oil as the 
primary energy resource for domestic consumption.  As its one true source of income, 
Iran relies on oil for the vast majority of its revenue.11  Iran’s problem lies in the fact that 
the government has regulated the price of gasoline in the country- the price of a gallon of 
gas in Iran is considerably less than the market price.  This has lead to a significant deficit 
due to government subsidies on gasoline.  As the price of gasoline has remained low, the 
demand in the country has risen a great deal.  Iran hopes to make up for this deficit by 
increasing its export profits on oil. 
The credibility problem Iran is facing as a result of its ties to terrorism12 and 
support for the destruction of Israel13 has been greatly amplified by what has recently 
 
10 Waltz, 126. 
11 Energy Information Administration, “Iran: Background” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Background.html (accessed May 5, 2006). 
12 Council on Foreign Relations, “State Sponsors: Iran” http://www.cfr.org/publication/9362/ 
(accessed May 5, 2006). 
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been revealed as several decades of clandestine nuclear programs.  This revelation- which 
originally was promulgated by The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an 
Iranian dissident group, in 2003 has created a severe lack of confidence in Iranian 
assurances that the country is only pursuing peaceful applications of the nuclear cycle.  
This lack of confidence is most vocally shared by the United States, Britain, France, and 
Germany, the three latter countries having established the EU-3 in order to pursue a 
diplomatic resolution of the situation.  Iran made a good faith effort in 2003 to convince 
the international community of the benign nature of its nuclear program by signing the 
Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which Iran is a 
signatory.14  The Additional Protocol signed by Iran in December of 2003 called for a 
voluntary allowance of more comprehensive and short-notice inspections by the IAEA on 
Iranian nuclear facilities.15
International suspicions concerning Iran’s motives would be assuaged if its 
leaders would curb its comments concerning the threat it perceives from the United 
States.  Time and again Iranian officials have accused the United States of attempting to 
prevent the country from gaining technological advances due to hypocritical policies.16   
E. THE RHETORIC 
The most glaring example of this rhetoric was presented by the newly elected 
conservative President of Iran in 2005. 
On September 17, 2005, the United Nations convened its 60th session in New 
York City.  This was to be a milestone session, as it would mark the first public speech 
by the newly elected Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadi-nejad.  The conservative 
president was expected to make statements concerning Iran’s nuclear aspirations, which 
 
13 Nasser Karim, “Iran Leader: Israel Can’t Continue to Exist,” ABC.com April 24, 2006, 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=1882648 (accessed May 5, 2006). 
14 IAEA, “Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards” December 18, 2003, 
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/iranap20031218.html (accessed May 5, 2006). 
15 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between 
States(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards,” September, 
1997, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc540corrected.pdf, (accessed May 
5, 2006), Arms Control Association, “The 1997 IAEA Additional Protocol At a Glance” January 2005, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtocol.asp (accessed May 5, 2006). 
16 “Iranian President: No ‘Nuclear Apartheid’,” CNN.com, September 17, 2005, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/09/17/ahmadinejad/ (accessed May 5, 2006). 
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has become one of the most publicized topics concerning the Middle East. The statements 
he did make were widely regarded as only exacerbating Iran’s dilemma rather than 
allaying international fears that the regime is pursuing nuclear weapons technology.  The 
remarks were to be the first in what has become a sometimes frenetic tirade concerning 
the rights of the Iranian people to develop the full nuclear cycle within their own territory 
as well as vacillations between demonstrations of cooperation with the IAEA and outright 
threats to the Agency concerning recommendations for United Nations sanctions.  Iranian 
rhetoric is often seen as misguided drivel, and rarely does anything to bolster 
international- let alone U.S.- confidence in the transparency and reliability of its 
government.  President Ahmadi-nejad’s attempt at subtle recrimination during his speech 
at the UN in 2005 is an example of the Iranian trend towards both attributing any 
international criticism as kowtowing to the United States as well as reminding the Arab 
world of U. S. support of Israel.   
Ironically, those who have actually used nuclear weapons, continue to 
produce, stockpile and extensively test such weapons, have used depleted 
uranium bombs and bullets against tens and perhaps hundreds of 
thousands of Iraqis, Kuwaitis, and even their own soldiers and those of 
their allies, afflicting them with incurable diseases, blatantly violate their 
obligations under the NPT, have refrained from signing the CTBT and 
have armed the Zionist occupation regime with WMDs, are not only 
refusing to remedy their past deeds, but in clear breech of the NPT, are 
trying to prevent other countries from acquiring the technology to produce 
peaceful nuclear energy.17   
As the only country having employed nuclear weapons in an attack on another country, it 
is obvious that these remarks are directed towards the United States.  The statement 
reflects one of the problems in Iran- the fact that much of what the people there believe to 
be true concerning the United States is based on significantly biased opinions and 
outright lies.  “For Iranians, the history is a constant stumbling block, made much worse 
by the fact that what they know as history is, in most cases, a distorted concoction of their 
own nationalist, religious, and even Marxist zealots.”18  Supporters of U.S. policy 
towards Iran would be hard pressed to describe that policy as fair and consistent, but the 
 
17 Global Security “Full Text of President Ahmadinejad's Speech at General Assembly” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2005/iran-050918-irna02.htm (May 5, 2006). 
18 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle (New York: Random House, 2004), xxii. 
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interspersing of baseless accusations ridiculous in nature with what could otherwise be 
formed into legitimate protestations paints Iranian policy makers as unbalanced and 
untrustworthy, labels which must be avoided if Iran is to curry favor with those foreign 
leaders who have input into decisions as to whether Iran will face action by the UNSC.  
President Bush has repeatedly expressed confidence that the IAEA will eventually refer 
Iran to the Security Council over its shortcomings and misrepresentations concerning its 
nuclear program.  The day before President Ahmadi-nejad made his accusatory speech at 
the United Nations, President Bush stated “I am confident that the world will see to it that 
Iran goes to the U.N. Security Council if it does not live up to its agreements.”19   
The Iranian President’s remarks were the first rebuttal in an international setting 
to the U.S. accusations that Iran is indeed pursuing nuclear weapons under the guise of a 
civilian energy program.  The Iranian regime has responded in very specific ways, 
including threatening the IAEA with the cessation of checks into its projects in the event 
of a referral to the UNSC.  The Iranian legislature has signed into law a measure that calls 
for the cessation of IAEA snap inspections if the matter is referred to the UNSC.  This 
same bill would allow for the resumption of uranium enrichment projects in the event of 
a referral.20  Iran’s credibility shortfall is only magnified with this announcement- the 
IAEA has accused Iran of a lack of transparency in its nuclear program, and that under its 
NPT and Additional Protocol obligations is required to allow IAEA inspectors access to 
its facilities.  The Additional Protocol, which was agreed to by the prior Iranian regime 
under a reformist policy, has not been ratified by the new administration, and the IAEA 
knows that adherence to this protocol is the only way the international community will be 
able to finally rule out the existence of a possible military motive for the program in Iran.  
Threatening to not only cease snap inspections, but also make it law that no inspections 
will take place, hardly seems an effective way to convince the world that it is only 
pursuing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. 
 
19 Anne Gearan, “Bush Confident on Iran After Putin Meeting,” ABC.com, Associated Press. 
September 16, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=1133233 (accessed May 5, 2006). 
20 “Iran Passes Law to End U.N. Checks,” Al Jazeera.net, November 21, 2005, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/5CE3BF4B-1F08-4A56-8F67-B218E4668771.htm (accessed May 5, 
2006). 
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The Iranian government has also released an invitation to the United States to 
actually participate in the development of one of its newest nuclear facilities.  “America 
can take part in international bidding for the construction of Iran's nuclear power plant if 
they observe the basic standards and quality, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza 
Asefi said in a news conference.”21  This move would, if accepted, clearly be in violation 
of the U.S. policy of unilateral sanctions against any domestic company which aids 
Iranian nuclear programs.  Participation in the Iranian nuclear program by its most vocal 
detractor- the United States- would surely be sufficient to satisfy the world of its peaceful 
intentions.  The Iranian regime surely understands this and is exploiting the issue.  In this 
situation, the United States once again finds itself in a position where its past policies 
hinder it in dealing successfully with Middle Eastern issues- it is in a no win situation.  If 
American companies are allowed to simply bid on, let alone fully participate in the 
development of any nuclear related projects in Iran without fear of U.S. government 
sanctions, Iran will have again shown the world that it can be successful in affecting 
change in U.S. foreign policy.  This is reminiscent of the 1979 hostage crisis and the 
belief held by a few that it rendered the outcome of the election of Reagan over Carter as 
a foregone conclusion.  If the United States continues to adhere to its policy of no face-
to-face involvement with the Iranian leadership, however, the superpower will assuredly 
be painted as uninterested in pursuing first-hand proof that the Iranian nuclear program is 
intended for peaceful purposes. 
Iran’s threats and denouncements were rendered moot at the beginning of March, 
2006.  On March 8, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei turned over his findings 
and recommendations concerning the Iranian nuclear program to the UNSC.  As the 
Council considers the information and possible responses, consideration must be made to 
statements given the same day by Iranian official Javad Vaeedi,22 as well as statements 
 
21 “US Firms Can Participate in Nuclear Power Plant Tender: Asefi,” IRNA.ir, December 11, 2005, 
http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-22/0512117639163244.htm (accessed May 5, 2006).
22 “Iran Remarks 'Provocative',” CNN.com, March 9, 2006, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/03/08/iran.nuclear/index.html (accessed May 5, 2006). 
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by Iran’s head nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani in March 5, 2006.  Larijani again hinted 
that there would be consequences if his country was referred to the UNSC.23   
F. U.S. RESPONSE 
Released in 2006, the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States 
emphatically states the position of the U.S. administration on the situation.  “Iran has 
violated its Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards obligations and refuses to provide 
objective guarantees that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.”24  The 
United States has maintained that Iran has been in violation of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the country hid its nuclear program for almost two decades 
before it reported to the world that it had indeed begun the program.  This admission was 
only forthcoming in light of the damning evidence presented to the world by the NCRI in 
2003.  There is little evidence to suggest that the Iranian regime would have revealed its 
project to the IAEA or the world had the NCRI not presented its findings when it did.  In 
light of the successful obfuscation of this enormous project on the part of the Iranians, the 
NSS describes it as one of the greatest challenges to the establishment of control over 
fissile material throughout the world.  Iran’s status as a sponsor of terrorism drives the 
call for the complete disclosure of all aspects of its nuclear program in order to convince 
the world of its exclusively civilian application.   
“The Iranian regime’s true intentions are clearly revealed by the regime’s refusal 
to negotiate in good faith…”25  Iran has made several half hearted attempts to sway the 
opinions of the world by seeming to accept certain proposals from other countries, only 
to renege on them in what many label as stalling for more time to complete the 
technology.26
One of the most recent attempts of the Iranian regime to garner support for their 
cause came in the form of an unprecedented letter from Mahmud Ahmadi-nejad to 
 
23 “Iran Issues Warning on Uranium Enrichment,” CNN.com, March 5, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/03/05/iran.nuclear/index.html (accessed May 5, 2006). 
24 The White House, National Security Strategy of The United States of America, (Washington DC: 
GPO 2006), 19. 
25 Ibid., 20. 
26 “Iran Rejects Compromise Nuclear Deal,” Al Jazeera.net, November 12, 2005, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/587F873D-19B8-4372-A1A0-4271C9A1ABD8.htm (accessed May 
5, 2006). 
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President Bush.  The letter is the first direct communication between the Presidents of the 
two countries since the severance of diplomatic ties after the 1979 hostage crisis in Iran. 
Ostensibly, the letter is an effort on the part of the Iranian government to propose 
“…new ways for getting out of the existing vulnerable world situation…”27  The lengthy 
letter makes no mention of the current nuclear impasse; rather it makes pointed 
judgments concerning the character and actions of President Bush in a religious context.  
The initial U.S. response has been to dismiss it as superfluous, failing to address the 
current differences between the Iranian regime and the rest of the world, and failing as an 
opening to dialogue with the United States.28
G. CASE STUDIES 
1. Russia 
Since the fall of the Iron Curtain at the end of the twentieth century, Russia has 
had to endure all the frustrations of a failed state, with the added barb of being rapidly 
reduced from one of the two most powerful nations on earth to a establishing a forced 
friendship with its only significant antagonist during its time in power.  Through 
cooperation with Iran, Russia seeks both economic advancement and a means with which 
to challenge the United States in the Middle East.   
2. China 
The Chinese economy is rapidly growing into one of the largest in the world.  
Ranking just behind the United States in exports, primarily in machinery and equipment, 
China’s thirst for energy is staggering.  China’s meteoric rise to economic dominance on 
the world market has placed it in a position to challenge the United States as the largest 
economy on earth, which could in turn place China in a position as a regional hegemon in 
Asia.  Support for Iran would at the same time weaken the U.S. position in the Middle 
East as establish the reliable energy partner China so desperately needs to feed its 
voracious industrial base.   
 
 
27 “Iran Letter Makes Fresh Offer to U.S.,” Al Jazeera.net, May 8, 2006, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/1184143F-7D33-4562-89F4-BCC2B18D6117.htm (accessed May 
11, 2006). 
28 Anne Gearan, “Rice: Iran Letter Doesn’t Resolve Standoff,” ABC.com, Associated Press. May 9, 
2006. http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=1939522 (accessed May 11, 2006). 
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3. India 
As with China, India’s economy is growing at an unprecedented pace.  Not only is 
India one of the world’s largest consumers of oil, the country is also pursuing natural gas 
as one of the more prevalent energy resources in the country.  Iran, in addition to being 
the second largest supplier of oil in the Middle East, also has the distinction of possessing 
the second largest reserve of natural gas in the world.29  India’s pursuit of a pipeline 
which would deliver natural gas through Pakistan from Iran has great political and 
financial implications.  Not only would the successful development of this pipeline allow 
for energy security in India, it would at the same time establish a partnership with 
Pakistan, with whom India has historically been antagonistic.  Should Iran indeed attain 
the technology to make an atomic bomb, this partnership would place three nuclear 
capable countries, sharing borders, in the Middle East/South Asia region.  The 
implications for what this would do to the stability of the region are staggering, and 
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II. RUSSIA’S CASH COW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Flying in the face of nearly two centuries of hostility between the two countries, 
an unlikely partnership has been established between Russia and Iran.  There are two 
factors driving the ties between the two countries.  The first centers on money- Russia has 
an enormous technology producing infrastructure, and has little in the way of a target 
consumer base.  Iran is both willing and capable of purchasing vast amounts of Russian 
military technology, making the relationship extremely lucrative for Russia while serving 
to strengthen Iran’s military.  Another, perhaps stronger factor behind Russia’s 
intransigence is the wish to once again become a counter to the United States’ hegemonic 
status.  Iran shares borders with Russian states, and, as an ally in the region, could greatly 
improve the chances of Russia becoming the dominant presence in Asia it once was. 
This chapter will examine briefly the history between Russia and Iran, illustrate 
the reasons that Russia initially pursued its current relationship with the Iranian regime, 
and finally show why Russia is unlikely to support any action by the international 
community which would result in hampering Iran’s economic freedoms.   
As the United States supported the Shah’s regime in Iran prior to the Revolution 
in 1979, and then severed all ties with Iran during the Iran/Iraq War, Iran came to solidify 
its opinion of the United States as a duplicitous devil.  The same opinion can be said to 
have developed concerning Russia, only its origins are much older.  Like the United 
States, Russia also supported Iraq during the war, and Iran became completely 
outmatched in a war which cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of its citizens.30
As U.S. foreign policy has made it difficult to successfully engage the Iranian 
government concerning its nuclear ambitions, so to has international policy vastly 
clouded the way ahead in staving off the Iranian pursuit of nuclear technology.  One of 
the largest suppliers of this technology to the Iranians- Russia- has been placed in a  
 
 
30 Michael Eisenstadt, “Russian Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran: Policy Challenges for the 
United States,” Arms Control Today, March 2001; 31, 2; Military Module p. 15 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_03/eisenstadt.asp (accessed May 5, 2006). 
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position in which it would be considerably less beneficial to adhere to the advice of the 
international community than to continue what has become an extremely lucrative 
relationship with Iran.   
As with many of the Middle Eastern countries, foreign influence has created a 
great deal of strife and dissatisfaction.  Iran is no exception to this observation, as the 
influence of the former Soviet Union since the turn of the 20th century has created a 
relationship between the two countries which is at the same time tenuous and 
confounding to the efforts of the rest of the world to successfully deal with Iran and its 
nuclear program. 
B. STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 
This relationship between Russia and Iran can hardly be seen as originating out of 
common ideologies or pacific interaction.  The strong ties that bind Iran and Russia are 
centered on money, and currently exist only out of necessity, as circumstances have left 
the two without other options for the type of commerce they demand.  Iran has money, 
which Russia is in desperate need of, while Russia has conventional and non-
conventional military technology, which Iran increasingly feels the need to obtain in 
order to provide for its own security.  This need for security arises out of several 
centuries of betrayal, attacks and occupation of foreigners in the Middle East, much of 
which was Persian territory controlled by ancestors of contemporary Iranians. 
Throughout the 20th century, Russia could be classified as an aggressor towards 
Iran, initially as a partner with Great Britain in 1907 and later as an occupier after World 
War II.  The spheres of influence set up in Iran as a buffer between Germany and the rest 
of the region were only abandoned by the Russians a year after the end of the Second 
World War.  The Russian occupation of its territory, however, only partly contributed to 
the sense of threat Iran felt in the region.  During World War II, the Russian government, 
out of fear that the local population would aid a possible Nazi incursion into the region, 
forcefully deported the entire population of Chechnya to Kazakhstan and Siberia.  
Chechnya has been attempting to declare its independence from the Soviet Union since 
the 19th century, but after the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Russian troops have brutally 
quelled any insurrection in Chechnya in an effort to keep what is left of Russia intact.   
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This violence has been visited on a people that Iran sees as fellow adherents to 
Islam.  Hundreds of thousands of civilians may have died in the wars between Chechnya 
and Russia, contributing to the Iranian idea that its northern neighbor is still quite capable 
of visiting great violence on a people.31  This fear of the fallen superpower is what makes 
the relationship between Russia and Iran so strange, and at the same time points towards 
the unlikelihood of it being abandoned by either party.  The successful transfer of 
military technology to the Iranians points towards the ability to overlook the violence 
meted out to Muslims in Chechnya, suggesting that there is very little that can derail the 
dealings between the two countries. 
Russia is supplying surface-to-air missiles, long range/ large payload missiles and 
nuclear technology to a neighbor which has been the target of naked aggression, 
duplicitous policy and indirect attack for over two hundred years.32  In 1800 Russia’s 
Czar took over Georgia, a major territory in Iran which had been theirs for 100 years.  
The early 1900s brought Russian invasion and occupation.  After establishing strong 
economic ties with Germany, 1940 brought a Russo-Anglo invasion of Iran, which had 
repeatedly declared its neutrality at the outbreak of the Second World War.  The 1979 
Iranian Revolution decried Russia and its persecution of Muslims within its borders.  
Then in the mid-eighties, Russia was a chief supplier of weapons and training to Iraq 
during the Iran/Iraq war, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of 
Iranians.33   
Iran has little reason to trust Russia, but rather has many reasons to want to either 
exact some sort of vengeance or ensure nothing resembling Russian aggression will ever 
again be visited upon it.  Why then is such a lucrative relationship now being seen 
between two countries whom have been such strong antagonists in the past?  The answer 
is that Russia has a surplus of exactly what Iran wants, and Iran is willing and able to pay 
 
31 Human Rights Violations in Chechnya, http://www.hrvc.net/htmls/references.htm (accessed May 
11, 2006). 
32 Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia to Sell Antiaircraft Missiles to Iran in Billion-Dollar Deal,” New York 
Times.com, December 3, 2005, 
http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F30F15FD39550C708CDDAB0994DD404482, 
(accessed May 11, 2006). 
33 Fariborz Mokhtari. 2005. “No One Will Scratch My Back: Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical 
Context,” The Middle East Journal; Spring 2005; 59, 2; Research Library, 209. 
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handsomely for these products and services.  Ironically, this phenomenon has been 
created by the very policies that Western nations, especially the United States, had 
doggedly pursued in the past.  These Western nations now are attempting to remedy a 
problem that they inadvertently helped to create by urging the Soviet government to tear 
down that wall. 
C. ACTIONS AND REACTIONS 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the 20th century created an 
enormous advantage for the United States, as it removed from world influence the only 
superpower capable of challenging the United States militarily.  The conventional and 
nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union would have, if utilized, decimated the United States 
and its Allies and caused incalculable destruction.  The end of the Cold War brought with 
it a deep feeling of relief that the world no longer had to live under the threat of nuclear 
annihilation.   
The concern that was birthed by this collapse, however, was centered on the 
question of what the vast but greatly under-utilized infrastructure in Russia would then do 
to support itself.  The same companies and machinations that were once guaranteed a 
customer in the Communist regime faced obsolescence and bankruptcy once that 
customer no longer had the means or the motivation to continue investing in its military.  
The Soviet threat may have evaporated in 1991, but the manufacturers of the Soviet 
military machine found themselves able to peddle their wares on the open market, and 
there is no shortage of eager, and more importantly financially stable, customers seeking 
exactly the types of products that Russia could provide.  Companies which were once 
forced to provide for the government in a Communist state now found that they could 
continue to produce the same product but also sell it for previously unattainable profits in 
a Capitalist market.  “The Soviet Union’s collapse also unleashed its arms industry, 
which suddenly was willing to sell Iran systems- such as Kilo-class attack submarines 
and advanced naval mines- at bargain prices that the USSR never had.  This meant that 
Iran could again indulge its own regional hegemonic aspirations.”34
The combined effect has been that the lure of easy money in a skyrocketing 
market has greatly complicated non-proliferation efforts with regard to missile and  
34 Pollack, 254. 
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nuclear technology.  “The unfortunate combination of corporate greed, lack of 
bureaucratic restraint, and relaxed Russian views on proliferation means that Russia is in 
no position to be a reliable partner in the fight against proliferation, let alone to offer a 
solution to the problem.”35  Iran, a country which feels threatened from all sides and 
jilted by conflicting policies of superpowers, has both the financial means and the internal 
motivation to remain one of the most voracious consumers of Russian weapons 
technology.  In perfect harmony with this is Russia, which has vast knowledge and 
expertise in the field of military and nuclear technology, yet has no domestic demand for 
its product and very little in the way of a comparable international consumer base.   
During the Iran/Iraq War in the eighties, Russia was a chief supplier of arms and 
technology to Iraq.  Iraq gave The Soviet Union both a consumer for its wares and an ally 
in the region.  United Nations sanctions against Iraq in 1990 after the invasion of Kuwait 
created the need for Russia to find another customer for its wares.  Enter Iran.  To the 
consternation of the United States, Russia has become the largest supplier of technology- 
both nuclear and conventional- to Iran.  In the current debate concerning Iran’s 
motivation in pursuing nuclear technology, Russia has also emerged as one of the most 
vocal optimists, maintaining that there is no evidence that Tehran is pursuing nuclear 
weapons and that the Iranian nuclear program is within the rights of the country.  “The 
latest steps taken by Iran have convinced us that Iran does not intend to produce nuclear 
arms, Putin said.  In this context, we will continue cooperation with Iran in all areas, 
including the nuclear energy field, Putin said.”36
The United States has continuously maintained that Iran is pursuing nuclear 
weapons rather than simply attempting to develop energy resources for civilian 
applications.37  Covert programs, rejection of IAEA protocols, incendiary rhetoric and 
threats against United Nations Security Council referrals lend credence to the idea that 
Iran is pursuing nuclear technology for more sinister purposes than energy.  Russia has 
 
35 Eugene Rumer, Dangerous Drift: Russia’s Middle East Policy, Policy Paper no. 54, Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, xiii. 
36 “Putin: Iran Not Developing Nukes” CNN.com February 18, 2005 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/18/iran.russia/ (accessed May 11, 2006). 
37 U.S. Department of Energy, “US Powerpoint Presentation on Iran's Nuclear Activities,” 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/us_ppt_on_iran.pdf (accessed May 11, 2006). 
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offered to supply Iran with the uranium necessary to operate the country’s nuclear 
reactors, and then store the spent fuel in Russia to assure the world that Iran will not 
attempt to further enrich the uranium for military application.  “On August 21, Russian 
Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev reported that agreement had been 
reached with Tehran providing for the return to Russia of all spent fuel: “We will return 
all the spent nuclear fuel, and it will not fall into anybody's hands but Russia's... Now we 
are completely legitimate.”38  Signed by Iran and Russia in February of 2005, this offer 
was supported by the United States, the EU-3 and the IAEA, but will only come into 
effect when the Bushehr reactor comes on line, which may not be until the end of 2006.  
Exporting spent fuel is one way to ensure that fuel does not become weapons grade, but 
Iran has all the ingredients located within its borders to practice the entire cycle, 
including domestically mined uranium.  Russia may well be able to keep track of and 
dispose of all nuclear fuel that it exports to Iran, but Iran maintains that it will soon be 
able to create its own fuel in quantity.39  Iran’s actions in the past suggest that they are 
capable of continuing to dissimulate their activities on a large scale, and enriching their 
own yellowcake while utilizing foreign supplied fuel would not be comparatively 
complicated. 
The Non Proliferation Treaty denies non-nuclear states the right to develop 
nuclear weapons.  It does nothing to even discourage the development of peaceful nuclear 
technology which will be utilized for energy purposes.  The problem that arises is that the 
paths to both are the same.  All the equipment needed to create weapons grade nuclear 
material is the same as that needed to create electricity.  The process towards creating 
Low Enriched Uranium is such that the same equipment can then be utilized- with 
significantly less effort or time- to produce the Highly Enriched Uranium that is needed 
for weapons applications.  The Isfahan enrichment facility has been in operation for quite 
some time, and is not being inspected by the IAEA.  Iran has the capability to make LEU, 
and without inspections will be able to feed it back into its facilities to produce HEU.  
 
38 The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy. 2002. “US Continues to Harry Russia on 
Export Policy,” Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 67, October - November 2002 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd67/67nr12.htm (accessed May 11, 2006). 
39 “Iran Announces It Has Enriched Uranium” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.org, April 11, 2006, 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/C59B0997-AA09-4DEA-9894-D56DDB342179.html 
(accessed May 11, 2006). 
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After stating that it would consider Russia’s proposal for uranium enrichment, supply and 
disposal, Iran’s latest statement was that it wanted Russia to explain the agreement more 
thoroughly.  “The Russian proposal about Iran's nuclear activities has problems and 
ambiguities that need to be clarified in further talks,” Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali 
Larijani, told Igor Ivanov, who heads the Russian Security Council, in a telephone 
conversation Thursday, state-run television reported. Larijani did not specify the 
problems.”40  Iran in the past has suggested more talks and more time, and is considered 
by some to be stalling for time. 
The Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) located in Isfahan represents one of the 
most ambiguous aspects of the Iranian claims towards a peaceful application of its 
nuclear program.  It is unlikely, however, that there will be any accountability as to how 
much fuel Iran is making on its own soil.  Isfahan would lose its usefulness if Iran accepts 
fuel from Russia in addition to disposal services.  It also seems unlikely that Iran would 
ever agree to receiving fuel from Russia after investing so much into the technology and 
facilities essential in making its own fuel.  Past experience and recent revelations 
concerning Iran’s ability to carry on with large clandestine projects raise serious doubts 
as to the possibility of discovering the use of fuel about which the United Nations or the 
rest of the world has no knowledge.  “What is important for us is that we be entrusted to 
carry out enrichment in Iran.  As for participation by other countries in Iran's uranium 
enrichment programme, we will consider it if there is any proposal.”41  Domestic 
enrichment raises its own concerns; however, as the supply of uranium in Iran is 
insufficient to power the facilities Iran has announced it will build for even close to their 
life-expectancies.  “Setting economics aside, even if speculative uranium deposits in Iran 
are assumed and included, Iran is not close to possessing sufficient uranium to fuel seven 
1000 MWe for their lifetime. It is thus impossible for Iran to avoid dependence on a 
foreign supplier for its uranium fuel.”42
 
40 “World in Brief,” The Washington Post, December 30, 2005, http://proquest.com/ (accessed May 
11, 2006). 
41 “Iran Rejects Compromise Nuclear Deal,” Al Jazeera.net, November 12, 2005, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/587F873D-19B8-4372-A1A0-4271C9A1ABD8.htm (accessed May 
5, 2006). 
42 U.S. Department of Energy.  
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Iran has maintained that it is their right to create the entire cycle within their 
borders,43 even going so far as to say that they would share their expertise with their 
neighbors.44  This is unacceptable to the United States, as it considers Iran to be 
irresponsible and further proliferation of any nuclear technology in the Middle East 
Region would likely lead to the nuclear armament of terrorists operating out of that 
region.  “State Department spokesman Adam Ereli told a briefing, “Iran, as its record 
demonstrates, has a long history of trying to develop weapons of mass destruction, 
supporting terror.  We view with concern any suggestion that Iran would seek to 
contribute to very destabilizing and unhelpful international behavior.””45
Recently however, Iran has come out with possibly encouraging statements 
concerning Russia’s offer of Iranian enrichment and disposal on Russian soil.46  This is 
some of the most mollifying discussion to date, and if accepted, would go a long way 
towards convincing the world that Iran does not seek material for nuclear weapons. 
D. INTENTIONS CANNOT BE PROSECUTED 
Admittedly, the evidence against Iran is circumstantial, as there has been no 
discovery of domestically produced highly enriched uranium in Iran.  The government’s 
behavior, however, is truly damning, pointing to a widespread policy of duplicity and 
covert projects that only began to be uncovered in 2002, with the revelation of the Natanz 
and Arak facilities by the National Council for Resistance to Iran (NCRI).  Why, then, 
does the Russian government make little or no effort to condemn the activities of Iran?  
The answer lies in the billions of dollars that Iran pays Russia for nuclear energy and 
conventional weapons technology.  “The creation of an independent Russian Federation 
after the collapse of the USSR was accompanied by a change in Middle East arms 
supplies policy. Russia’s financial needs became a much more important factor in 
decisions to sell military equipment.  At the same time, the arms industry emerged as a 
 
43 “Iran Will Welcome Proposal for Enrichment Inside Iran, Larijani,” IRNA.ir, 
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45 Ibid. 
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semi-independent lobby in promoting such sales.”47  Due to the dual use nature of much 
of the equipment Russia is providing, it is very difficult to prove that the technology is 
being used to develop weapons, and as long as the Russian government continues to deny 
harboring any suspicion to the contrary, Russia can continue to legitimately provide Iran 
with nuclear technology and equipment.  The IAEA has made taken no concrete steps to 
suggest action even after finding the regime in violation of its obligations under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), lending a great deal of leverage to the Russians in their 
dealings with Iran.  Until the United Nations or at least the IAEA make official 
denouncements of Iran finding the projects there to be in violation of international 
treaties, Russia is free to pursue whatever policy it wishes in regards to Iran, and 
currently that policy focuses on making money, certainly not attempting to curtail the 
proliferation of nuclear know-how.  In light of the eight hundred million dollar contract 
signed between the two countries to build a light water reactor in Bushehr, as well as the 
possible billions more dollars to be had in future projects, it is certainly in the best 
interests of Russia to maintain its nuclear relationship with Iran.   
Not only is it in the best interests of Russia economically to maintain trade with 
Iran, it is entirely possible that the government has very little say in the situation.  The 
Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) was one of the most powerful institutions in 
Russia prior to its replacement by the Federal Atomic Energy Agency in 2004.  
MINATOM’s great influence and power was owed in large part to the vast numbers of 
unemployed nuclear-field workers left over from Soviet days.  “Its precarious financial 
condition and the memory of its privileged status in the Soviet days have given 
MINATOM’s leadership a powerful political weapon.  The agency’s top officials, as 
custodians of the nation’s nuclear patrimony and representatives of hundreds of 
thousands of disgruntled workers and their families, claim to speak on behalf of an 
important political constituency.”48  MINATOM was granted a certain autonomy in 
deciding who it would involve itself with, and the Russian government is not 
complaining that Iran has become a partner.  President Putin has more motivation to keep 
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his people employed and earning than he does to sever ties with one of the largest sources 
of revenue he has at his disposal.  Reneging on his deal with Iran to produce nuclear 
reactors would eliminate the enormous influx of revenue it is generating, but at the same 
time it would eliminate the thousands of jobs his people are currently working there, as 
well as the prospect for thousands more jobs in the future, as Iran has stated that they will 
likely continue to build reactors throughout the country.  “Russia is building the Bushehr 
plant as part of a deal that could bring Moscow additional, similar construction projects 
in the future. Last year the head of the Russian Federation’s Atomic Energy Agency said 
that Russia may build seven more nuclear plants in Iran.”49  The head of Russia is now a 
popularly elected official, and has to worry about reelection, which before the collapse 
was not nearly as much of a concern.  Creating gainful employment for thousands who 
suddenly found themselves without work after the fall of the Soviet Union would 
significantly add to Putin’s popularity. 
E.  PURSUING WORLD-POWER STATUS 
Russia also sees in Iran a route to regional dominance.  The country’s society and 
economy has been in a continuous decline since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 
last part of the twentieth century, while the United States has steadily increased its 
influence over the entire globe.  Continued normal relations with Iran, seen as the most 
powerful force in the Middle East, will greatly aid Russia’s pursuit of power in the 
region.  This power that Russia seeks arises out of the increasing leaning towards the way 
the country functioned under the Soviet model.  “The task of reforming a nation crippled 
and demoralized by decades under an inhuman regime proved insurmountable.”50  The 
upheaval caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union over a decade ago is still sharply felt 
throughout Russia.  The failure of the new government to adequately care for its people 
has given rise to a resurgence of state-controlled institutions and policies.  The United 
States recently made accusations suggesting that the Russian government was slipping 
back into a Soviet mentality, sacrificing the steps it has taken towards democracy in order 
to solidify its position as an energy giant.  “…in Russia today, opponents of reform are 
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seeking to reverse the gains of the last decade.  In many areas of civil society -- from 
religion and the news media, to advocacy groups and political parties -- the government 
has unfairly and improperly restricted the rights of her people.  No legitimate interest is 
served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail, either by supply 
manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation.”51  Russia’s apparent lack of 
interest in the Iranian nuclear showdown is in keeping with the idea that Russia is more 
interested in generating revenue than in the possible ramifications of a nuclear-armed 
Iran. 
Russia’s path to an influential status is greatly aided by the unstable international 
oil market.  This is because Russia needs higher prices for oil in order to overcome the 
comparatively high costs it has for delivery of oil from its remote sources.  Not only is 
Russia a consumer of oil- it is also a producer.  Russia is the second largest producer, and 
more importantly, the second largest exporter- of oil to the world market.52  The current 
unpredictability of the situation in the Middle East has effectively kept the price of oil on 
the international market high, with record prices having become the norm in the last 
several months.  This translates into excellent profits for most exporters.  The Middle 
Eastern oil exporting countries can still turn a healthy profit when oil prices are lower, as 
they do not have to invest as much as other countries in transportation costs.  Russia, on 
the other hand, has to transport it’s oil a much longer distance over rougher terrain in 
order to get it to refining and distribution centers, which drives up the cost, in turn 
reducing profit margins.  It is for this reason that Russia would prefer to see the price of 
oil high, as Russia benefits greatly from the higher oil prices which result from 
uncertainty in the oil market.  This uncertainty currently is rampant due in large part to 
the Iranian nuclear dilemma- the possibility of sanctions removing Iran’s oil from the 
market make speculators drive up the prices in anticipation of a smaller supply in the face 
of growing demand.   
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Russia has shown signs that it is willing to resort to extreme measures to prove 
that it retains influence in the East, especially in the energy sector.53  The Iranian nuclear 
showdown is an excellent opportunity for Russia to extend and strengthen its relations 
with a close neighbor who is both vehemently anti-Western and in possession of the 
power to subvert the power of the West in thee Middle East.  Maintaining a soft approach 
to Tehran both shows opposition to the west at the same time it cultivates cooperation 
with the Iranian regime.  Further evidence which would suggest Russia is attempting to 
garner stronger relations in the Middle East can be seen in Moscow’s breach with the 
international community concerning the newly elected government in Palestine.  Labeled 
a terrorist organization by much of the world, Hamas has pledged itself to the destruction 
of the Israeli state.  When Hamas won control of the Palestinian Parliament in 2006, the 
United States, along with the European Union, withdrew financial aid to the country, 
stating that the newly elected government would have to renounce violence and recognize 
Israel as a legitimate state in order to continue to qualify for that aid.  Both Iran and 
Russia have subsequently pledged to provide Hamas with financing.54
The influence the United States could exert over Russia under the leadership of 
Boris Yeltsin is no longer viable under Vladmir Putin- the vast amounts of financial aid 
that the United States poured in to the failed country after its collapse can now be found 
elsewhere.  Moscow has found a source of energy and financial gain in a country which 
shares its traditional antagonistic attitude towards the United States, so it no longer has 
the incentive to kowtow to the United States.  Evidence that this is happening, as 
illustrated by the turnaround in policy exercised by Putin in his most recent years in 
office, is decried in the NSS of 2006.  “Recent trends regrettably point toward a 
diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions.  We will work to try to 
persuade the Russian Government to move forward, not backward, along freedom’s  
 
 
53 Andrew Kramer. “Putin Talks of Sending Oil to Asia, Not Europe,” New York Times, April 27, 
2006, http://proquest.com/ (accessed May 11, 2006). 
54 “Palestinians to Get Russian Aid,” British Broadcasting Company.co.uk April 16, 2006 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4911310.stm (accessed May 11, 2006). 
29 
                                                
path.”55  The policies and rhetoric Vladmir Putin espoused early in his career have given 
way to another, much more focused goal- that of once more establishing itself as a world 
power.56   
F. CONCLUSION 
Russia has no reason to end its dealings with Iran.  The economic needs of the 
country demand a continued influx of foreign capital, and Russia is in a position to 
provide services that command a high price at least in Iran if not on the world market.  
The most dedicated pursuant of these services right now is Iran, and they have not been 
conclusively shown to be developing nuclear weapons, so no international legal action 
can be taken against them.  As the United States has no way of providing any sort of 
compensation to Russia that could compare with the financial windfall that is realized 
with weapons and technology sales to Iran, it is unlikely that Russia can be convinced 
that sanctions are the best way to deal with the problem. 
During the Cold War, Russia’s economy relied on a military-oriented 
government, with nuclear and military technology as its chief pursuits.  Some would 
argue that the military infrastructure Russia had developed actually surpassed the United 
States in scope, and now that equipment and technology can no longer be supported by 
the government.  The wealth of nuclear equipment and knowledge in Russia was, and 
continues to be, enormous as well.  No longer able to employ the vast numbers of nuclear 
scientists and manufacturers it once could, the Russian government has had to allow for 
the export of technology that was once jealously guarded. A lack of domestic demand has 
forced those nuclear specialists to seek compensation for their skills elsewhere.  Russia 
has found in Iran the means to market the commodities it has focused upon for decades, 
but no longer has a demand for. 
The Iranian nuclear dilemma also promotes instability on the international energy 
market, while in turn this instability promotes anticipatory speculation, which is one of 
the factors, which drives up oil prices.  Russia sees more profit from these higher prices, 
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and the least demanding method of keeping those prices high is to- albeit passively- 
maintain an atmosphere which directly results in instability.  Russia is doing nothing to 
actively destabilize the region, but neither is Moscow interested in taking steps which 
would at the same time greatly reduce uncertainty and effectively eliminate a major 
source of its income. 
True to the Realist theory, Russia sees in Iran a partner with whish it can pose a 
united front against the influence of the United States in the western hemisphere.  
Cooperation with Iran strengthens Russia with a continued influx of revenue while at the 
same time helping to create an ally in Iran with the very real possibility of becoming the 
dominant state in the Middle East. 
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III. CHINA’S ECONOMIC JUGGERNAUT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The reforms implemented by China over the past several decades have allowed 
for unprecedented growth in the Chinese economy.  China has for some time been selling 
military technology to Iran in an effort to solidify relations between the two countries and 
to allow Iran to become self-sufficient in developing its own missile technology.  What 
obligations does Beijing feel towards international opinion concerning the perniciousness 
of Iran’s nuclear program?  This chapter explores the dealings China has with Iran and 
suggests that China has acted and will continue to act in its own best interests regarding 
Iran, and that those best interests ultimately involve allowing Iran to continue on its 
current path to achieving the full nuclear cycle within its borders.  China’s civil 
relationship will be summarized first, followed by an analysis of China’s growing 
dependence on Iran for its energy needs.  Finally, China’s transfers of military 
technology to Iran will be considered as an illustration of the extent of the cooperation 
between the two countries. 
“China has been increasingly supportive of the nonproliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, eager to be viewed as a “responsible stakeholder” within the 
international community.  At the same time, however, China’s economic boom has 
resulted in an energy thirst that is now affecting Beijing’s foreign policy.”57  The pace at 
which China’s economy has been growing over the past several decades makes 
inescapable the truth of this statement, and China will be hard pressed to put this growth 
at risk by adopting an aggressive policy towards Iran at the behest of the United States 
and the United Nations. 
China’s economy is one of the fastest growing in the world.  With a population of 
one-point-three billion people, China is able to field a workforce of over seven hundred 
and ninety million, or almost three times the entire population of the United States.58  The 
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Communist government in China is desperately holding the reigns of what many consider 
the fastest growing economy in the world and what has officially become the second 
largest economy as of 2005.59  This growth has come about due to extreme reforms set in 
motion decades ago, and has set China on a fast track to economic dominance on the 
world stage.  No longer a purely Communist state, China has entered the world market 
and allowed for privatization of a large portion if its industry.  As an illustration of the 
rise of the Chinese economy, one can look at the trade relationship between it and the 
United States since the inception of trade reform in China.  “…from 2001 to 2004, U.S. 
exports to China increased nearly eight times faster than U.S. exports to the rest of the 
world, and China rose from our ninth largest export market in 2001 to our fifth largest 
export market in 2004…In 2004, imports from China totaled $197 billion, nearly double 
the total for 2001, and China is now the United States’ second largest supplier of 
imported goods and our third-largest trading partner.”60  The efforts at reform in China 
have resulted in rapid growth for China, but also an unprecedented dependence on the 
outside world for continued growth. 
Among the problems that China faces due to the frenetic pace of its growth are a 
possible recession and an increasing dependence on external sources of energy.  As 
Beijing attempts to address the former, it finds itself increasingly in competition with the 
rest of the world over the latter. 
B. SINO-IRANIAN RELATIONS  
Relations between Iran and China date back to the early twentieth century, when  
both countries established diplomatic ties with each other after the end of dynastic rule in 
China.  Iran was one of the first Middle Eastern countries to recognize the new 
government in China.61 This was the start of what has been a relationship marked by 
positive and negative attitudes towards one another. 
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With the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, diplomatic 
ties between the two countries were discontinued.  As competition for dominance in Asia 
and differing opinions concerning the nature of Communism kept China and Russia at 
odds in the nineteen sixties and nineteen seventies, China looked on Iran as a useful tool 
with which to weaken Russia’s presence in the region.  China was even then willing to 
risk the ire of the rest of the world in order to maintain close ties with Iran, especially as 
the Soviets had established their presence in Afghanistan in 1979.  The 1980 vote at the 
United Nations in response to the hostage crisis in Iran was abstained by China62, an 
illustration of the importance China had placed on continued relations with the country 
even in the face of its blatant transgressions. 
China’s relations with Iran have in recent years taken on very real form, with 
cooperative projects on infrastructure in Iran being carried out by Chinese companies.63  
China is looking to the future in creating its deals with Iran, as the agreements are 
normally long-term and involve Chinese assistance in development of the facilities from 
which energy, be it in the form of oil or natural gas, is produced, refined or delivered.  In 
this way, deals between China and Iran are not limited to simply purchasing Iranian oil 
for consumption in China.  These extremely lucrative deals usually entail China’s 
companies furthering the exploitation capabilities of the Iranians, succeeding in not only 
delivering China’s much needed energy demands, but at the same time giving Iran more 
capability to harvest its natural resources for sale on the international market.  “Iran will 
also export 150,000 barrels of crude per day to China after Sinopec has developed the 
Yadavaran field, Xinhua reported. It valued the deal at $70bn (£38bn).”64  The 
Yadavaran oil field in Iran is one of the largest reserves Iran has, and through this deal 
China has ensured that it continues to receive shipments of this oil from Iran for years to 
come. 
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Sino-Iran relations also include new cooperative projects in the satellite 
communications sector.  A recent delivery of a Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) 
communications systems to Iran will allow Iranian oil companies the ability “… to 
provide voice, data and video transfer service for the Iranian oil company along its crude 
oil pipelines in the country's 15 provinces.”65  This illustrates the commitment China has 
in securing the transfer of oil out of Iran and into China by giving Iran a reliable means of 
monitoring its growing energy distribution infrastructure. 
C. ENERGY BLACK HOLE 
The reforms in China’s economic sector over the past decades have created in the 
country a massive increase in demand for energy resources.  This growth is only expected 
to continue, with total Chinese energy consumption seen as growing between four and 
five percent at least until the year 2015.  This is in comparison to the one percent increase 
in energy consumption for other industrialized nations over the same period.66
1. Oil 
Rocketing from consumption of one-point seven million barrels per day in 1980 
to five-point five million barrels per day in 2003, China’s growth has been consistent and 
remarkable.67  Once able to sustain its economy on domestic production, however, China 
now is forced to look outside its borders for resources.  It became a net oil importer in 
2003, as its demand outstripped its domestic production capabilities. 
As the second leading supplier of oil to China, Iran’s position on China’s list of 
friends is assured.  With a fourteen percent share in China’s oil imports, Saudi Arabia is 
the only country more heavily invested in this ravenous consumer.68
 As the second most demanding nation in oil consumption, China is in no position 
to threaten Iran with sanctions on the one product that is essential to the continued growth 
of Beijing’s economy.  “…given its growing oil dependency, it seeks increasingly to 
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find- and to control- sources of supply abroad.”69  China’s actions with regard to Iran- 
establishing at least partial interest in the source as well as contracting for long-term 
purchasing of the product- is the most concrete illustration of the nature of the 
relationship between the two countries, as well as a signal that China is unlikely to give 
up these investments in order to please the West. 
2. Natural Gas 
The South Pars natural gas field, jointly owned by Iran and Qatar, represents sixty 
percent of Iran’s reserves and almost seven percent of the world’s reserves.  Iran’s 
estimated total reserves of natural gas, which are second only to Russia’s reserves, range 
from nine hundred thirty- to nine hundred ninety trillion cubic feet.70
In 1982, China consumed three hundred eighty-one billion cubic meters of natural 
gas.  By 2004, this number had skyrocketed along with the rates for other sources of 
energy.  Consuming one point three trillion cubic feet in 2004, the country more than 
tripled its consumption rate.  This rate is only expected to increase.  “Overall natural gas 
consumption in China is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 7.8 percent, from 
1.2 trillion cubic feet in 2002 to 6.5 trillion cubic feet in 2025.”71  This means that China 
will be forced to import more and more gas from other countries long into the future.  
Possessing the second largest natural gas reserve in the world, Iran is certainly a country 
with which China needs to remain on close terms with. 
As part of the Yadvaran oil field deal signed between Iran and China, in which 
China gained a majority stake in the field, China agreed to purchase ten million tons of 
Liquefied Natural Gas from Iran over several decades.  The deliveries have not yet 
started, as Iran must first acquire the ships with which to transport the gas to China.  
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to Iran.  Obviously, the terms of this enormous deal show that the two countries are 
considering and planning for a long-term relationship concerning energy trade, and it is 
unlikely that this relationship will be voluntarily interfered with. 
D. MILITARY COOPERATION 
China has also found a customer for other types of military technology in Iran, 
including ballistic and cruise missiles.  If Iran is indeed pursuing a nuclear weapons 
capability, it would follow that the regime will also be seeking the means to deliver a 
nuclear payload via ballistic missiles.  Much of the technology China has provided Iran is 
related to the testing and production of ballistic missiles.   
China has been providing material and technology to the Iranians for years.  This 
is a lucrative arrangement that has continued in the face of U.S. opposition.  U.S. 
denunciation of theses deals has been demonstrated by sanctions on Chinese technology 
companies at various times over the past decade.  “During the 1990s, China made 
substantial progress in adopting international nonproliferation norms, joining 
international agreements, and controlling exports of sensitive goods and technologies. 
Yet, throughout that period, China still had the reputation of being an indiscriminate 
proliferator, willing to sell almost anything to anybody.”72   
China’s sales of military technology have been varied and extremely helpful to 
the Middle Eastern nation.  These sales range from anti ship cruise missiles to short and 
long range ballistic missiles to a more recent trend of sharing dual use technology.   
The most noted transfers came about as a result of the Iran/ Iraq war in the latter 
part of the twentieth century.  China supported both sides against each other with sales of 
Silkworm and C-801 anti-ship missiles to both Iran and Iraq.73
As recently as 2003, China completed deals with Iran on ballistic missile 
development technology which moved Iran closer to becoming self sufficient in 
producing its own missiles.74
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China is helping Iran to gain the ability to produce its own delivery systems for 
large payloads. 
Among the most disturbing trends in Sino- Iranian relations is the transfer of 
technology that would enable Iran to carry out its own indigenous research and 
development of large payload missiles.75  “…the two nations have advanced from a 
straightforward seller/buyer relationship to one of technology transfer and co-ordinated 
weapons co-development.”76  Control of proliferation can be demonstrated through 
sanctioning offending institutions, but this ability would become impotent if Iran were 
able to simply produce its own military technology. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
China’s economy is on a path to becoming one of the most amazing success 
stories in modern times.  With unprecedented growth and investments and projects in all 
corners of the world, China certainly is an economic success story.  In order to maintain 
this growth, Beijing will have to both reign it in somewhat and maintain access to the 
boundless supplies of energy it will continue to demand.  Middle Eastern oil and natural 
gas are two forms of energy which Iran has in abundance, which are readily accessible 
and are exactly what China needs to fuel its development.   
Removing Iranian energy from the world market through sanctions originating out 
of the UNSC would be severely detrimental to the chances of China either remaining at 
its current levels of production or maintaining this growth.  China has for decades shown 
the world that it is willing to supply Iran with restricted technology.  This policy began 
and flourished when the only benefits were an external source of income and a partner in 
containing the Soviet Union.  The Chinese position in Asia is no longer threatened by the 
Soviet Union- Russia is struggling in its own way to once again become a presence on the 
continent.  China no longer requires the aid of Iran to remain dominant in the region.  
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What China now depends on Iran for is no less than it’s continued survival- a continued 
energy partner willing to provide for the ever growing needs of Chinese industrialization 
and development.  It would be foolhardy for China to bite the Iranian hand that feeds it 
with any sort of punitive action.   
While maintaining that Iran should not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons, 
Beijing at the same time has espoused a somewhat kid-glove approach to dealing with 
Tehran’s continued defiance.  China has opposed the reporting of the issue to the UNSC, 
instead maintaining that the problem be handled by the IAEA.77  This suggestion is an 
illustration of China’s wish that nothing be done to Iran that could result in serious 
economic consequences, as the IAEA is simply a “watchdog” for the United Nations, and 
has no power to take punitive action against a non-compliant state outside referring the 
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IV. INDIA’S CONVENIENT NEIGHBOR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
What incentive does India have for cooperating with the United States and the 
international community in preventing Iran from achieving a complete and indigenous 
nuclear cycle?  The answer is “none.”  This chapter will show that there is no reason for 
India to support the policies of the EU-3, the United States or the United Nations 
concerning the Iranian nuclear crisis.  On the contrary, the benefits of continued 
cooperation with India to the Indian economy dictate that India will stop short of 
supporting any type of punishment which would remove Iranian energy exports from the 
world market.   
In this chapter, India’s relationship with the Middle Eastern state will first be 
discussed, followed by an analysis of India’s burgeoning economy and the associated 
energy shortfalls India is experiencing.  Finally, the implications of one of the major 
proposals for cooperation between the two countries- the natural gas pipeline from Iran, 
through Pakistan and ultimately into India- will be examined. 
India’s economy is growing at a pace comparable to China.  Currently enjoying 
both the benefits and challenges of a booming economy, India faces a problem in the 
dearth of natural resources located within its borders.  This situation puts India an 
untenable position regarding involvement in the Iranian nuclear standoff.  If India were to 
agree to any type of punitive measures against the regime in Iran, it would face the very 
real possibility of undermining its chances at continued prosperity.  Iran, as one of the 
largest producers of both oil and natural gas in the world, is invaluable to most of the 
energy consuming world, but especially so to a country possessed of such a rapidly 
expanding economy as India’s- an economy dependant on external sources of energy.   
Similar to China, India depends a great deal on external sources of energy.  India 
differs somewhat from China, however, in the type of resources it seeks.  India is a major 
consumer of natural gas, with a consumption rate predicted to grow continually in the 
foreseeable future.  Discoveries of relatively large deposits of natural gas within its own  
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borders have been exploited, but are not expected to keep pace with demand, forcing 
India to continue its search for reliable external sources for its energy needs.78  Iran could 
prove to be one of its largest suppliers. 
Aside from the economic advantages of importing Iranian oil, a continued civil 
relationship with Iran and the rest of the Middle East is in line with India’s growing 
influence on the world stage.  As a rising power, it is in the interests of New Delhi to 
remain on positive terms with other powerful nations in the region.  Iran, although 
labeled as a rogue supporter of terrorism and a human rights abuser, is nonetheless a 
strong presence in both the Middle East and the world.   
This chapter will consider India’s growing economy and how foreign energy 
sources-particularly Iran’s -are essential to continued growth in India.  Next will be an 
analysis of the relations between Iran and India to the present day.  Finally, a presentation 
of the reasons India has for continued stable relations with Iran will be made. 
B. INDO-IRANIAN RELATIONS 
India and Iran have a history consisting of more than energy needs.  Even decades 
after the partition of the country along religious lines, Muslims still account for the 
second largest religious group in the country.  Shias make up a percentage of India’s 
Muslim population, giving Iran and India another common bond.  “I would say Iran is the 
largest Shia Muslim country in the world. We (India) have the second largest Shia 
Muslim population in our country and I do believe that thanks to our unique history we 
can be a bridge.”79 India’s Prime Minister sees religious ties with Iran, adding strength to 
the justification of cooperation between the two countries.   
Foreshadowing the attention that the two countries would dedicate to energy 
cooperation, Iran and India signed the Tehran Declaration in 2001.  Addressing terrorism, 
the situation in Afghanistan, nuclear disarmament and regional cooperation, the 
Declaration specifically stated the two countries would pursue the exchange of energy 
technology.  “The geographical situation of Iran and its abundant energy resources along 
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with the rapidly expanding Indian economy and energy market on the other, create a 
unique complementarity which the sides agree to harness for mutual benefit. In this 
context they agreed to accelerate the process of working out an appropriate scheme for 
the pipeline options and finalising the agreement reached on LNG.”80 This agreement is 
early and concrete evidence that India and Iran profess to be of like minds concerning 
important issues on the world stage, and are willing to overlook fundamental differences 
in order to reap the benefits of continued close ties.  Iran, as a mostly Muslim country, 
puts less emphasis on the fact that India is a Hindu country at odds with Pakistan, another 
Muslim country, than on the fact that India is a prime customer for energy.  India is 
willing to set aside Islamic fundamentalist rhetoric on the part of the Iranian regime in 
order to secure a long-standing commitment from an energy rich neighbor. 
Again in 2003, India and Iran signed another agreement covering many of the 
same issues addressed in the Tehran Declaration.  The New Delhi Declaration, this time 
signed in India, further defined the ideologies of the two countries concerning states that 
support terrorism, the peaceful resolution to the troubles in Iraq, and energy cooperation.  
A sign of the complicated nature of the relationship- from an American standpoint- is the 
clause concerning a mutual defense agreement.  The two countries “…also decided to 
explore opportunities for cooperation in defence in agreed areas, including training and 
exchange of visits.”81  Although ambiguous in its meaning, the clause illustrates India’s 
willingness to publicly state that they are willing to work with a state sponsor of 
terrorism.  How strong this agreement actually is remains t be seen, but India’s actions on 
the world stage with regard to Iran’s nuclear aspirations has shown that they are not 
averse to going against American and European wishes in support of the Iranian regime.  
C. INDIA’S GROWING ENERGY NEEDS 
India is possessed of one of the fastest growing economies in the world.82  
Demonstrating a seven-point-six percent growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
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India’s economy is growing more than twice as fast as the United States.83  It has been 
recognized that there will continue to be a significant increase in India’s demand for both 
oil and natural gas in order to keep up with the developments in its industries.  Natural 
gas consumption in India in 2010, for example is projected to be more than double what 
it was in 2003.  “Of all the variables that could hinder India’s economic progress, energy 
scarcity and dependence are probably the most serious. …dependence on oil imports 
could rise from 70% to 80-85% over the next two decades.”84 India’s leaders understand 
that they cannot be swayed by external pressures when it comes to the continued welfare 
of its society.  They are aware that continued long-term access to energy is 
“imperative.”85  With development comes energy needs, and one of India’s closest 
neighbors happens to be an energy giant, more than able- and certainly willing- to aid 
India in it’s continued growth.   
D. THE “PEACE PIPE”  
Originally proposed in 1998 by the Iranians as a means to market its surplus 
natural gas to Pakistan, the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline has since become the topic of 
much debate among the three countries.  Stretching sixteen hundred miles from Iran’s 
South Pars gas field through Pakistan and finally into India, cost estimates for the project 
lie between four and five billion dollars.  If realized, all three countries would not only 
realize great economic benefits, but could possibly enter into an era of unprecedented 
cooperation and peace. 
The pipeline has encountered resistance from several standpoints. 
The historic rivalry between India and Pakistan was the first issue which still 
poses the most complicated dilemma.  The two countries have fought several wars over 
their history, and continue to have grievances over a myriad of issues.  India does not 
want the pipeline, as an essential source of energy, to turn into a noose around its neck 
over which Pakistan maintains control.  India does not want Pakistan to control the flow 
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of this gas into India, as a cooling of relations between the two countries would put a 
large percentage of India’s energy sector under the influence of an antagonistic Pakistan.  
Negotiations between India and Iran have entailed locating the control valves, or 
“spigots” into and out of the pipeline in Iran and India, leaving it impossible for 
unanticipated interruption of the flow of gas unless the pipeline is actually destroyed.86  
A section of the hundreds of miles of the pipeline which would lie in Pakistani territory 
would actually have to be damaged in order to deny India the gas from the pipeline.  If 
this was to occur, and an anti-India force was to somehow disrupt the flow of gas through 
the pipeline, Pakistan would also suffer financially, as a fully functioning pipeline will 
also be of benefit to them.87  This safeguard will be seen as the incentive for Pakistan to 
maintain the integrity of the pipeline.   
Opposition to the project has also been voiced from the United States, which has 
citied the enormous financial windfall for Iran should the deal go through.  On a trip to 
New Delhi, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reminded India and the world of the 
strong opposition the United States held for any sizable project which benefits the Iranian 
economy.88  On a recent trip to Islamabad, however, President Bush seemed to soften this 
position and took the opportunity to remind the world that “Our beef with Iran is not the 
pipeline; our beef with Iran is the fact that they want to develop a nuclear weapon…So 
we're working very hard to convince the Iranians to get rid of their nuclear ambitions.”89  
The United States recognizes the fact that the revenue gained by Iran from the pipeline 
will complicate efforts at economic sanctions, but to attempt to deny India and Pakistan 
the same benefits from the pipeline would be deleterious to growth in those countries.  
India has more to gain from continued dealings with Iran than it does from supporting 
U.S. protestations over the Iranian nuclear program.  As the President’s remarks in 
Pakistan seemed to show that there was less opposition to the project from the U.S. 
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administration, National Security council Spokesman Fredrick Jones took an opportunity 
to clarify the U.S. stance in the most concrete terms to date.  “As we stated before, the 
U.S. government does not support the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline.”  The United States, 
along with citing Iran’s continuing disregard for the recommendations of the international 
community and the IAEA, also states that cooperation with Iran should be avoided due to 
that country’s ongoing support for terrorism and history of human rights violations.90  As 
one of thee largest sources of oil and gas in the world, Iran is correct in seeing itself as 
essential to many other countries in the world who need Iran’s energy to maintain a 
healthy economy.  This perception is supported in the fact that India refuses to bend to 
external pressure when such subservience would assuredly lead to a recession in its 
economy through energy shortfalls. 
India’s response to external pressure to forsake the pipeline has been dismissive.91  
The prospect of such a vast cooperative project between the three countries, especially 
between India and Pakistan, is seen as a large step not only towards obtaining a reliable 
and enduring source of energy, but also towards peace in the region, as economic 
cooperation between countries could possibly be the precursor to normalized and 
peaceful relations.  The project “…is a study in how economic collaboration possesses 
the power to engender as well as transform social and political discourse between 
countries.”92  Given the conflict-ridden history of the countries involved, particularly 
Pakistan and India, it will be exceedingly difficult to convince any of them that this 
project- an anticipated path to peace as well as an economic boon- should be abandoned. 
Over and above the pipeline deal, Iran and India have recently penned an 
extremely lucrative, long term development agreement which would suffer greatly under 
internationally recognized sanctions on the Iranian regime.  One of India’s top energy 
companies, the Gas Authority of India Ltd (GAIL), signed an agreement with the 
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National Iranian Export Corporation which will last for thirty years, and would entail 
both the delivery of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to India from Iran as well as GAIL 
involvement in the further development of Iran’s vast gas fields.93  The agreement 
between the two countries is estimated to be worth fifty billion American dollars, and 
would deliver almost eight million tons of LNG to India per year.  This deal would likely 
collapse if the United Nations Security Council were to target Iran’s energy exports with 
sanctions. 
Iran has also been dismissive of assertions that energy cooperation should be 
abandoned between the two countries.  Iran is in a position where there is very little for it 
to lose and a great deal to gain.  As the world demand for energy resources grows, there 
will be less and less interest in removing Iran’s oil or gas from the market through 
sanctions.  Sanctions targeted at other Iranian exports or investment in the country will 
meet the same resistance, as many of the companies and countries involved in purchasing 
energy from Iran also have interests in development and exploitation of in Iran.  If India 
removes itself from the deal with Iran, there will be other customers for Iranian energy 
both in the region and outside it.  Ali Reza Sheik Attar, once the Iranian Ambassador to 
India, “…insists the pressure won’t work.  “India is not the sole customer of Iran’s 
gas.”94  Pakistan has said that it will pursue the pipeline with or without India,95 and 
China has expressed an interest in joining the pipeline project as well.96   
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The international consortium currently conducting negotiations with Iran in the 
effort of putting a halt on that country’s nuclear pursuits has very little leverage to utilize 
in order to convince other countries to take up the same cause.  Iran has vast amounts of 
the exact product that India needs most, and India is in a position to establish and 
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maintain access to that product.  There exists little or no incentive for India to abandon its 
energy cooperation deals with Iran, while it can only benefit from an enduring and 
healthy relationship with the Middle Eastern state. 
The pipeline project between Iran, India and Pakistan is fraught with 
complications, both economic and ideological, but will likely not be scrapped due to the 
influence of forces outside the countries involved.  Ashley Tellis, a Senior Associate at 
the Carnegie Institute for International Peace, recently testified to this fact in front of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Washington, D.C.  “The negotiations over the 
Iranain-Pakistani-Indian gas pipeline are unlikely to succeed simply because of economic 
considerations, but New Delhi is unlikely to concede to any demands that rupture its 
diplomatic and economic relationship with Tehran if these are seen to have no 
relationship to the issue of nuclear proliferation.”  India agrees that a nuclear armed Iran 
is not a desired outcome of nuclear development projects, but it is unwilling- and 
currently unable- to risk being shut off from such an enormous source of energy in such 
close proximity. 
India also has a certain level of pride in its accomplishments.  Citing its past 
performance and success, Indian Defense Minister put forth further evidence that it is 
proud of, and will continue to pursue, its unilateral efforts at economic growth.  “It would 
be prudent to bear in mind that we have achieved what we have achieved within a largely 
unfavourable social, economic, technological and international environment, and mostly 
on our own effort, without the benefit of special relationships and access to markets that 
most other major economic powers, other than China, have had.”97
The evidence shows that India is intent upon maintaining its pattern of growth and 
prosperity, and that it is unwilling to entertain options which would put this period of 
growth in jeopardy.  Sustained cooperation with Iran in the energy sector is exactly what 
India needs in order to extend this period of growth, successfully realize its goal of 
solidifying its position as a dominant force in South Asia, and establish a lasting era of 
cooperation, if not permanent peace, between two historically antagonistic nations. 
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While Realist Theory would suggest that economic cooperation between two 
countries is by no means a guarantor of peace between them, India’s actions towards 
suggest that it is still acting in what it considers the best way to establish itself as a strong 
force in South Asia, powerful enough to stand it’s own both in the world economy and 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The negotiating team of the EU-3 has very few options to exercise which would 
convince the Iranian regime to give up its aspirations of establishing the entire nuclear 
fuel cycle within its borders.  The support of the entire UNSC council on implementing 
comprehensive sanctions on Tehran will be the only way that the international 
community can show unity in this cause.  United Nations sanctions on energy exports 
from Iran are the only type of action that could cause Tehran enough discomfort to 
submit to international demands of cooperation with the IAEA.  The likelihood of China 
and Russia- as permanent, veto-holding members of the Security Council- agreeing to 
these types of sanctions is virtually nonexistent.  The same can be said of India- the 
economies and strategic goals of these countries demand a continued and unencumbered 
relationship with Iran.  These relationships would end if energy sanctions were 
implemented against Iran, so it is in the best interests of these governments to remain on 
good terms with Iran.   
A. RISK ASSESSMENT 
Iran’s nuclear policy holds that they have the right to develop the entire nuclear 
cycle on their own soil.  Due to the dual use nature of the nuclear cycle, peaceful nuclear 
applications can be utilized to produce weapons grade uranium with very little 
modification to an established infrastructure.  The NPT does not say that a signatory 
cannot enrich uranium within its own borders, so the Iranians are in effect correct in 
claiming that it is their right to develop the entire cycle on their own.  This is a problem 
with the wording of the NPT, according to the director of the IAEA, which must be 
addressed.98  This ambiguity is the reason that the United States’ demand for UN- 
supported sanctions can be so easily ignored- there is no legal basis for punishing Iran 
based on the evidence the IAEA has been able to gather so far.  All that the IAEA has 
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been able to determine is that, based on the evidence to date, the IAEA is unable to 
determine that there is no military dimension to the Iranian nuclear program.99
A nuclear warhead is of little use without the means to deliver it to an intended 
target.  Iran is on the right track to become capable of developing both a nuclear weapon 
and the means to deliver that warhead to wherever it wants.  With its continued research 
into uranium enrichment at its own facilities, Iran will soon be in a position where it will 
require no external help in developing the capability of destroying another country.   
Tehran’s comments concerning the coming destruction of the state of Israel could 
be the vitriolic statements of a conservative government playing for support of the 
masses.  It may be that Iran has no intention of utilizing nuclear weapons on the Jewish 
population in the Middle East.  If Iran is allowed to proceed on the path it has chosen 
towards nuclear capability and ballistic missile development, Israel would have very little 
warning prior to impact if Iran did decide to launch a nuclear missile at them.  Israel 
believes that Iran instigates a great deal of the violence which occurs in the West Bank100 
and has stated that a nuclear capable Iran will not be tolerated.101  Iran’s stance 
concerning the right of Israel to exist coupled with Israel’s perception of threat from a 
nuclear armed Iran cannot be ignored.  The international community must take steps to 
deny Iran the ability field nuclear weapons for this and the reasons cited previously. 
B. THIS WATCHDOG CAN’T BITE 
Calls for the IAEA to handle the problem are illustrative of wishes to prolong the 
situation without coming to any concrete resolution.  Iran has stated that it wants the issue 
to remain under the purview of the IAEA.  China and Russia have said the same thing.  
After several years of inspections and pleas for cooperation, however, the IAEA still had 
unanswered questions concerning the nuclear program in Iran.102  The problem with this 
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is that the IAEA is not a negotiating instrument.103  The IAEA is an investigating and 
reporting body- it has no power to implement any type of punishment on those it finds to 
be in violation of international treaties.  
In the event of failure of the recipient State or States to take fully 
corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may take one or both 
of the following measures: direct curtailment or suspension of assistance 
being provided by the Agency or by a member, and call for the return of 
materials and equipment made available to the recipient member or group 
of members. The Agency may also, in accordance with article XIX, 
suspend any non- complying member from the exercise of the privileges 
and rights of membership.104
The only actions that the IAEA is permitted to take are exclusionary.  The IAEA 
can simply withdraw its expertise from a project not proven to be peaceful in nature.  
Punitive measures can only be implemented by the UNSC, and then only with the 
unanimous vote of the entire council. 
The IAEA depends upon its researchers and inspectors in order to come to a 
conclusion concerning the nature of a countries nuclear program.  Iran significantly 
curtailed that cooperation with inspectors and continues to refuse attempts to solidly 
ascertain the nature of its programs.  As set forth in the NPT, signatories agree to accept 
advice and help from the United Nations, through the IAEA, in order to develop peaceful 
and safe nuclear programs in an arena which is infinitely complex, and where the 
slightest bit of incompetence could lead to disaster.  Signatories also pledge to submit to 
inspections from the IAEA on all declared facilities involved in nuclear research and 
production.105  If Iran truly wishes to convince the world that its intentions are innocent, 
it should allow for limitless inspections by the IAEA.  This would create confidence in 
the program at the same time that it would make available to Iran all the technological 
wisdom it needs to create a successful civilian program. 
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Iran recently offered to take up direct negotiations with the United States 
concerning their nuclear program.  The United States made it clear that it is willing to 
take up these face-to-face talks on the condition that Iran first verifiably ceases all 
uranium enrichment activities.  Iran answered by stating that they would not respond to 
any suggestion of giving up what they continue to maintain is their legal right- namely 
the freedom to develop the entire nuclear cycle within their own borders.106
A package of incentives was also developed by the EU-3, the United States, 
China and Russia in early June,107 aimed at giving Iran an alternative to enriching its own 
uranium.  Before the details of the offer were even presented to Tehran, however, they 
were rebuffed, again with the statement that Iran had the legal right to enrich its own 
uranium and that no offer would be considered which suggested a cessation of current 
enrichment activities.108
The stalemate that has developed in the negotiations with Iran seems 
insurmountable in light of the continued failure of negotiation.  Iran has refused all offers 
which suggest enriched uranium originate exclusively from anywhere other than within 
its borders, to the point of dismissing proposals before the details are even revealed.  The 
incentive package developed in early June was delivered to Tehran, and is being 
considered.109
Also in early June, the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 
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administration would place in peril the continued supply of Iranian oil.110  The overtones 
of much of the Iranian rhetoric focus on the United States, with little mention of the 
shared opinions of the rest of the negotiating nations.   
C. PLAYING TO THE MASSES 
The fact that much of the rhetoric and threats coming from the Iranian regime are 
directed specifically at the United States points towards the motivations behind them, as 
well as the serious nature of the statements.  Singling out the “Great Satan” as the 
oppressor in this situation, when there are several other nations voicing the same 
opinions, plays to the historical mistrust of the United States held by the Iranian regime.  
Local support of the Iranian people is more easily solidified if the United States is painted 
as an aggressor in this situation, rather than one of several nations attempting to divert 
Iran from its current path.  Garnering the support of those who remember the antagonism 
between the United States and Iran over two decades ago will solidify internal support for 
Iran’s nuclear aspirations. 
D. HOW FAR TO TAKE IT? 
The United States has dealings and interests with much of the industrialized 
world.  U.S. trade with China is growing continuously.  The United States consumes 
almost one-third of Chinese exports.111  Strategic interests in South Asia have led the 
United States to promulgate a comprehensive and controversial nuclear treaty with 
India.112  Our cold war adversary- Russia- is attempting to once again reestablish itself as 
a regional power in the East and it has been suggested that Moscow may be sliding back 
down a path to autocracy.113  These countries are of interest to the United States due to 
the power they stand to achieve in their particular areas of the world, and strategic 
partnerships with them would only help the United States maintain its position on the 
world stage.  Harming Iran would in turn jeopardize our relations with these countries, 
due to their own ongoing relations.  
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The punitive action which has the best chance of affecting change in the Iranian 
regime would be sanctions on oil exports.  This type of action would be harmful to Iran 
as its only major source of income, but it would also have severe implications for Chinese 
trade, U.S.-Indian strategic cooperation, and the stability of a democratic Russia. 
Foreign policy in the United States as well as its economy depends on normal 
relations with nations all over the world, including the three who are currently seeming to 
balk at placing prohibitive sanctions on the Iranian regime.  The United States cannot 
afford to create antagonists out of these countries any more than it can afford to cause the 
removal of Iranian oil from the world market.  Iran, in this way holds a great deal of 
leverage in the world order.  An excellent illustration of this fact is the lack of 
effectiveness of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996.  “Iran has attracted an 
estimated $30 billion in foreign investment in its petroleum sector since ILSA was 
enacted. The European Union (EU) opposes the application of ILSA sanctions to 
companies in member countries, and on November 22, 1996 passed resolution 2271 
directing EU companies not to comply with ILSA.”114  ILSA was passed by the United 
States in August of 1996.  Less than three months later, the European Union (EU) came 
out with a law in exact opposition of the U.S. Act.  This shows the level of cooperation 
the United States had from its allies in attempting to curtail the development of Iranian 
energy infrastructure.  Russia, china and India are actively pursuing joint cooperative 
ventures in the energy sector with Iran, so they cannot be expected to support sanctions 
on this most precious of commodities any more than the EU did ten years ago. 
Each time the Iranian regime makes a threat against oil supplies or another 
country, the price of oil increases.  This is due to the uncertainty of continued supply.  If 
for any reason Iranian oil is suddenly taken off the market, the price of crude would 
increase dramatically, as other producing countries do not have the excess capacity to 
maintain the world supply.  Demand for energy is only going to continue to increase, 
especially in the countries cited in this work, and attempting to deny them Iranian oil is 
not an option for the United States. 
 
114 Energy Information Administration, “Global Energy Sanctions,” 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sanction.html (accessed June 7, 2006). 
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Continued negotiations with the Iranian regime concerning the nature of its 
nuclear programs places the United States in an untenable position.  Joining the EU-3 at 
the negotiating table while Iran continues its research and development would be 
tantamount to forgiving past transgressions.  Continuing to settle for toothless measures 
promulgated by the UNSC amounts to the same thing- Iran will continue to claim its right 
to peaceful research, and China and Russia will continue to call for a resolution to the 
impasse through dialogue.   
The United States has maintained that a nuclear armed Iran is a threat to its 
national security and the security of its allies.  It is not a change or retraction of policy if 
the U.S. administration announces its support for a verifiably peaceful nuclear program in 
Iran.  At the same time, however, the United States should emphasize Iran’s own 
exhortations denouncing nuclear weapons as un-Islamic and specifically not a goal of the 
regime.   
The United States needs to make it clear that while the world can support the 
peaceful development of nuclear technology in Iran, that research must be under the 
unfettered supervision of international bodies and adhere to Iran’s obligations as set forth 
in the NPT.  An explicit proposal of action must be formulated and agreed to by the entire 
UNSC in the event that it is discovered that Iran has diverted nuclear technology to 
military or terrorist applications or institutions.  This should be done now, while it is still 
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